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Abstract: An entry barrier in the labor market can be an important source of wage inequality. 
This paper finds that social networks, father’s education and political status, and urban 
household registration status (hukou identity), as well as their own education, experience, age, 
and gender,  help people enter high-wage industries. When contrasting coastal and inland 
samples, after instrumenting  social networks by household political identity (based on 
classifications during the land reform in the 1950s), we find that social networks are more 
helpful for entering high-wage industries. The implication of this paper is: breaking industrial 
entry barriers in the urban labor market is an essential policy in order to control 
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When discussing inter-industrial income inequality, there is a tendency to focus on monopoly 
in the product market, while overlooking entry barriers in the labor market. In fact, both 
aspects are necessary conditions for inter-industrial income inequality. Monopoly in the 
product market generates excess profit, and an entry barrier in the labor market is fundamental 
to unfair competition that enables workers in monopoly industries to share excess profit. In 
order to deepen the study of inter-industrial income inequality, we need to ask key questions: 
Who can enter high-wage industries? How are they able to enter? The critical step for 
alleviating such inter-industrial wage inequality is to find the determinants of entry barriers in 
the labor market. 
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Our research shows that, in China, inter-industrial wage inequality is not always 
generated by differences in productivity. The causes of inter-industrial wage inequality have 
long been debated among scholars. Some literature refers to the mechanism of efficiency 
wages (Chen and Edin, 2006), while other research regards the disparity as a kind of industry 
rent induced by non-competitive factors (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 
1989). Few of these studies consider entry barriers in the labor market from the perspective of 
non-market factors. Therefore, our research provides a new perspective to understand 
widespread inter-industrial wage inequality. In particular, this paper provides important 
evidence for the future evolution of China’s urban labor market. If non-market forces 
construct entry barriers in the labor market, then breaking such entry barriers and promoting 
fair competition in the urban labor market are essential policies to reduce China’s urban wage 
inequality. 
 
Section 2 is a brief review of the literature related to our research. Section 3 introduces 
the data and the basic model. Section 4 extends the model by introducing the instrumental 
variable, and Section 5 compares differences in entry barriers in the labor markets of different 
areas. Section 6 concludes and provides some policy implications. 
 
 
2. Inter-industrial Wage Inequality and Labor Market Segmentation 
 
For people who believe in the ideal of a free market economy, inter-industrial wage inequality 
is a confusing phenomenon. If the market is sufficiently competitive, the industry in which a 
person works should have no significant influence on personal income, assuming factors 
affecting productivity (such as education and experience) are accounted for. However, in 
reality, inter-industrial wage inequality is a worldwide phenomenon. Researchers have shown 
that even after controlling variables representing productivity, or using sibling data or panel 
data to control time-invariant unobserved fixed effects, inter-industrial wage inequality 
remains. Details can be found in Björklund et al. (2004)’s research on the U.S. and northern 
Europe, Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999)’s comparison between Germany and the U.S., 
and Pinheiro and Ramos (1994) which provides evidence about Brazil. In countries that are 
going through economic transformation, such as Russia, inter-industrial wage inequality is   3   
widening (Lukyanova, 2006). In China, Démurger et al. (2006) have shown that the average 
income gap between monopoly industries and competitive industries is significant. Aside 
from region, education, ownership, occupation, secondary job, full/partial employment, and 
age, inter-industrial wage inequality has increasingly contributed to income inequality. During 
1995–2002, the increasing contribution of inter-industry wage differentials to income 
inequality was mainly related to state-owned monopoly industries (Chen, Wan and Lu, 2008).   
 
One explanation of higher wages in some industries is that these industries are willing to 
pay wages above the market clearing level in order to achieve higher productivity. This 
mechanism is known as “efficiency wages.” Evidence provided by Chen and Edin (2006) 
supports the efficiency wage hypothesis. Arbache (2001) uses comparable and measurable 
productivity characteristics to explain wage differentials. He does not find evidence to support 
compensatory wages, but shows the existence of an efficiency wage mechanism in the 
manufacturing sector. Another explanation is that non-competitiveness in the product market 
and labor market is an important factor for inter-industry wage differentials. Monopoly power 
in the market helps enterprises to obtain excess profits. If there is no premise of excess profits, 
there is no source for an inter-industry wage differential. However, the labor market’s 
non-competitiveness is the other condition necessary for the existence of an inter-industry 
wage differential. If there were no entry barriers in the labor market, which means perfect 
competition among labor, then industry monopolies would not lead to inter-industry wage 
differentials. Krueger and Summers (1988) find that, even after the controlling of labor quality, 
working conditions, excess welfare, short-term demand shocks, unionization threats, 
collective bargaining, the enterprise’s scale, etc., there are still inter-industry wage 
differentials. They also find that higher wages are related to lower labor turnover in the 
industry, which demonstrates that high-wage industries obtain some rent from 
non-competitiveness. Katz and Summers (1989) also believe that workers get rent in 
high-wage industries. 
 
What kind of labor can enter high-income industries, and where does the labor market 
“rent” come from? This double question has two implications. First, after controlling for 
personal characteristics related to productivity, if there are other characteristics that 
significantly influence industry entry, then we can be sure that inter-industry wage inequality 
is not entirely caused by differences in productivity. Second, the current literature concerning   4   
China’s labor market segmentation puts more emphases on ownership (Chen et al., 2005; 
Démurger et al., 2006). If some non-productivity characteristics are found to influence 
industry entry, then we can identify the labor market segmentation by industry. This judgment 
is important for future improvement of the urban labor market. As is well known, there is no 
research relating an individual’s non-productivity characteristics to labor market entry. More 
and more people who lack urban household registration status (hukou identity), a nice family 
background, and urban social networks are entering the urban labor market. If non-market 
factors indeed become entry barriers , then these workers cannot enter high-wage industries. 
This result will aggravate the rising urban income gap. Therefore, breaking industrial entry 
barriers in the urban labor market is an essential policy for reducing China’s urban wage 
inequality. 
 
Will the process of marketization (often taken to be synonymous with economic 
development) weaken the effect of non-market forces as labor market entry barriers? This 
question is very important for predicting trends in China’s labor market. However, there is 
very little research on this topic. Our study separates samples of coastal cities from those of 
inland cities in order to contrast them. In particular, we compare the two regions in terms of 
the influence of social networks and urban hukou identity on industry entry. The changing 
impact of social capital (especially social networks, a kind of informal institution) is attracting 
the attention of economists in regard to the process of marketization. Stiglitz (2000) suggests 
that social networks may have enduring impact. However, the development of markets and 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations eventually replaces networks based on social 
groups, leading to a decline in the value of social networks and related social capital . A 
similar view is that the division of labor is simple during the early stage of economic 
development, and thus governance based on social networks (relational contracts) is better 
than that based on regulations (laws and democracy). With the development of the economy 
and labor division, the marginal transaction costs of regulation governance become lower and 
lower, and thus formal contracts gradually replace relational contacts (Dixit, 2003; Li, 2003; 
Krishna and Matsusaka, 2009). However, empirical research in China does not yield a 
consistent conclusion. In that country, if existing social networks are embedded into the 
market mechanism, their returns increase with the development of market mechanisms (Li, Lu 
and Sato, 2009). Our paper provides further evidence of the changing influence of social 
networks during the process of economic development and marketization.   5   
3. Data and Model 
 
The data used in our research comes from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project 
Survey (CHIPS2002) collected by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which is a 
sub-sample of the yearly household survey made by the National Bureau of Statistics. The 
urban survey data covers 12 provinces and municipalities, including Beijing, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Chongqing. As in the previous two rounds of the survey (1988 and 1995), the 2002 survey 
also samples from the yearly household survey performed by the National Bureau of Statistics. 
When choosing urban samples, a two-stage random sampling method is followed. In the first 
stage, cities, counties, and towns are chosen; in the second stage, families are chosen from 
these regions. 
 
As part of the first stage, cities, counties, and towns are classified into five categories 
according to population: megalopolis, metropolis, medium city, small city, and town. Within 
each category, cities are sorted into six regions: northeast, north, east, middle, northwest and 
southwest. Within each region, cities are ranked by their urban employees’ average wages. 
The last part of the first stage involves tallying the number of urban employees, and then 
sampling the cities and counties at the 1-million employee intervals. In the second stage, 
sample families are selected using a multi-stage random sampling method: districts are chosen, 
then neighborhood committees (juweihui), and finally families from each neighborhood 
committee. In medium and small cities, sampling starts with neighborhood committees, then 
moves directly to families. In 2002, there were 45,000 sample families in the yearly 
household survey made by the National Bureau of Statistics. These samples represent about 
450 million urban residents. Sample families are required to keep income and expenditure 
journals for three consecutive years and are interviewed every month. 
 
We also need to categorize industries according to whether they enjoy excess profits. We 
regress an income equation, controlling for the variables denoting productivity. Then we 
control industry dummies and identify each industry’s character by the sign and significance 
of industry coefficients. In previous research, we estimated a semi-logarithmic personal 
income equation, where income is the sum of wages, bonuses, price supports, income in kind, 
and secondary job income. Explanatory variables include secondary job, full/partial   6   
employment, gender, age and its square, Communist Party member, minority ethnic identity, 
level of education, and type of occupation. All these variables influence productivity. We also 
control for unit ownership and urban dummy. Our results show that in 2002 there were 6 
industries with significant wage differentials, taking the manufacturing sector as a reference 
group. From 1988 to 1995, the coefficients of two large industries (“transportation, storage 
and posts and telecommunication” and “finance and insurance”) changed from insignificant to 
significantly positive and their coefficients become larger. From 1995 to 2002, the coefficients 
of these two industries remained positive and become even larger. In 2002, wages in these two 
industries were 16.3% and 21.0%, respectively, higher than the average wage in 
manufacturing
1
In the model, we also control for personal socioeconomic characteristics including gender, 
marital status, age, education, experience, health, hukou status,
. 
 
The dependent variable of our model in this paper is an industry ranking variable. If the 
average wage in an industry is significantly lower than that of manufacturing in our income 
equation, then we define it as -1; if the difference is not significant, it is 0. If the coefficient of 
the industry dummy in the income equation is significantly positive, we define the ranking 
variable as 1. According to our estimation results for the income equation: low-wage 
industries include social service; five industries    (“electric, gas and water production 
supply,” architecture, “transportation, storage and posts and telecommunication,” “finance and 
insurance,” and real estate) are high-wage industries; and the other industries (including the 
benchmark manufacturing) are medium-wage industries. According to this definition, we 
adopt an ordered probit model. In such models, the direction of the marginal effect is not 
always the same as the coefficient’s sign. Therefore, for simplicity of interpretation and 
feasibility of the following instrumental variable estimation, we report the OLS results instead, 
because their coefficients have almost the same signs and significance levels as seen with the 
ordered probit model. 
 
2
                                                        
1  These results can be found in Chen, Wan, and Lu (2008). 
2  In our urban sample, 0.9% of the respondents report their hukou identity as rural, because they lack an urban hukou. During 
the urbanization process, many rural people have begun working and living in cities, but their hukou identity often remains 
unchanged. 
 minority group, and 
Communist Party standing. Because industry entry might be related to a worker’s past 
experience and performance, we control for the dummy variable of “has ever changed jobs.” 
In order to reflect personal desire to enter a high-wage industry we also control for the   7   
dependency ratio, which is measured by the number of non-working members in a household 
divided by the number of working members. Results are reflected in equation (1). As the 
primary non-productivity factor, social networks are controlled for in equation (2) and 
measured by “how many people could help you during job hunting.” Simple comparison of 
the means between groups shows that people in high-wage industries have more people to ask 
for help when seeking work (see Appendix 2). Social networks might have some relationship 
with some unobserved factors; therefore, in order to reduce possible missing variable bias, we 
add controls for family background: father’s education, his party membership, and whether he 
operated a business before 1960. Results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Comparing equations (1), (2), and (3), we find that most variables’ signs and significance 
levels do not substantially change. Only education’s coefficient decreases when more 
variables are controlled for. This implies that some of education’s influence on industry entry 
is through social networks and family background. Before discussing the results, we need to 
explain the measurement of Communist Party standing. We tried using the absolute value of 
party standing as an explanatory variable, but its coefficient was significantly negative and 
hard to explain. The effect of party membership is not only related to one’s seniority (number 
of years as a member, which is equivalent to party standing), but also to one’s age which 
correlates with party standing. Therefore, we use the ratio of party standing to age in order to 
measure political status rather than the party standing itself. The implication of this 
modification is: when age is controlled for, people who have greater political status (i.e., 
greater relative party standing) are those who joined the party at younger ages, and they have 
an advantage in the labor market. Because the influence of relative party standing might be 
non-linear, we also control for its quadratic term. 
 
In Table 1, the coefficient of social networks, which is our main focus, is significantly 
positive. This means social networks are helpful for individuals to enter high-wage industries. 
With social networks included in the regression, education’s coefficient decreases a little 
while the coefficients of the other variables do not change. When family background is added, 
the coefficient of social networks does not change significantly. Higher levels of father’s 
education and father’s party membership are also helpful for someone trying to enter 
high-wage industries. It is worth mentioning that the coefficient of father’s party membership 
is almost ten times that of his education. This means becoming a party member is equivalent   8   
to an additional 10 years of education in terms of being able to help a child enter a high-wage 
industry. We also find that hukou is a very significant factor influencing industry entry. This 
means the income differential of people who have different hukou identities, as described in 
previous literature (Meng and Zhang, 2001), partly comes from entry barriers in the labor 
market. All these results mean that non-productivity factors affect fair competition in the labor 
market. They transfer the excess profits of monopoly industries into personal monopoly gains 
through social networks, family background, and hukou.   
 
However, these results confirming entry barriers do not mean productivity factors are 
unimportant for industry entry. Years of education and experience each raise the possibility of 
entering high-wage industries. After controlling for experience (years of earning income), the 
coefficient of age is negative. This might mean that age induces unemployability in other 
aspects. Comparing the values of the coefficients, we can see that the coefficients of education, 
experience, and age are approximately that of social networks, but much lower than that of 
father’s party membership and personal hukou identity. Comparing the models’ goodness of 
fit, the adjusted R
2 decreases to 0.0477 when personal education, experience, age, and health 
are discarded as per equation (3). If social networks, family background, and hukou identity 
are not included, the adjusted R
2
Other variables’ coefficients are also interesting. It is not easy for individuals who have 
changed jobs to enter high-wage industries. This might be because changing jobs reflects (or 
is assumed to reflect) poor performance at previous jobs or discloses information about 
personal disregard for job stability. Further studies of this variable are needed. Compared to 
women, it is easier for men to enter high-wage industries. After controlling for other variables, 
gender affects industry entry so significantly and so strongly that we are compelled to 
attribute this result to gender discrimination. Relative party standing is significantly negative 
and its square is also significant in the model described by equation (3). After simple 
calculation, we find that the turning point of relative party standing is about 0.4315. When 
someone’s relative party standing is greater than the turning point, party membership is 
helpful for entering high-wage industries. For example, the critical point of relative party 
standing is 17.26 for a 40-year-old. That is, someone of that age must have joined the party 
 decreases to 0.0496. This means non-productivity and 
productivity factors are approximately equal in regard to explaining industry entry in the labor 
market. 
   9   
before age 23 in order to get a benefit for entering high-wage industries. For someone who is 
50 years old, having joined the party before age 29 is the turning point. 
 
In these models, there might be a measurement error in regard to the value of social 
networks for job hunting. For example, people may not utilize their networks as resources. In 
CHIPS 2002, respondents were asked how they find jobs, such as government arrangement 
(ordinary job re-assignment), getting a job at one’s parent’s place of work when the parent 
retires or dies, scoring well on a public exam, introduction from an employment agency, 
newspaper recruitment, private introduction, searching on one’s own initiative, and 
self-employment or private business (other answers were acceptable, including do not work at 
present). On the basis of equation (3), we classify two of the aforementioned methods as 
finding a job “through social networks”: getting a job at one’s parent’s place of work when the 
parent retires or dies; and private introduction. We define other ways of finding a job as being 
“through the market.” We take the latter category as a reference group and find that the former 
category raises the possibility of entering high-wage industries
1
Although we try to avoid measurement error by changing measurements of social network 
and we reduce possible missing variable bias by including family background in regressions, 
nevertheless there might be estimation biases induced by other missing variables. In particular, 
simultaneous endogeneity bias is a serious concern, because lower income individuals can 
take more advantage of their social networks to find jobs. In order to reduce estimation biases 
induced by the endogeneity of social networks further, we use the instrumental variable 
method. The instrumental variable we use here is father-in-law’s political identity during the 
land reform of the 1950s. This use of people related by marriage means we must drop 
. These results are reported in 
model (4). Results in models (1) – (4) are based on the OLS estimation, where the signs of the 
coefficients and their significance levels are almost the same as those in the ordered probit 
model. Model (5) uses an ordered probit estimation, where all the control variables are the 
same as in model (3).   
 
 
4. Endogeneity of Social Networks and Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
                                                        
1  If we regard government arrangement (ordinary job transfer) and employment agency introduction as “finding a job 
through social networks,” the conclusion does not change. If we use “do it oneself” (own initiative) as a reference group and 
control for various ways of finding jobs by using different dummy variables, we still find that the possibility of entering 
high-wage industries is higher for those who utilize a personal relationship (private introduction).   10   
unmarried samples. Because it is difficult to use instrumental variables for ordered probit 
models, we use the OLS method in the following estimations. Models (3) and (6) are OLS 
estimations for the entire sample and the sample-minus-unmarried, respectively. Comparison 
reveals that dropping unmarried samples only has a large influence on the coefficients of 
relative party standing and health. Other coefficients and significance levels do not change 
much. 
 
It is necessary to explain our choice of the instrumental variable. In the early days of the 
People’s Republic of China (late 1940s to early 1950s), Chairman Mao Zedong initiated the 
Movement of Land Reform to strengthen the power of the state and eliminate the 
counter-revolutionary forces hidden in rural areas. Families were labeled according to 
categories of political identities (“poor peasant or landless,” “lower-middle peasant,” 
“rich-middle peasant,” “rich peasant,” and “landlord”), based on their economic status and the 
acreage the family owned. The “excess” land and property of the “rich peasants” and 
“landlords” were redistributed to the “lower-middle peasants” and “poor peasants or landless” 
who had owned little or no land. As a result, the “lower-middle peasants” and “poor peasants 
or landless” who had been at the bottom of rural society jumped to the top in a sudden 
reversal of political status, while the “landlords” and “rich peasants” were deprived of their 
political and economic power, becoming a class of untouchables (“black class”). The lifelong 
political identity was an important criterion for judging someone’s worth in regard to 
employment, marriage, and many aspects of social life. In fact, political status was not 
identified strictly by property ownership. In places that lacked wealthy families, the local 
criteria for fulfilling the political task of redistribution were modified so that families which 
had enjoyed relations with the Kuomintang were labeled “rich peasant” or “landlord” and 
thereby suffered loss and humiliation (Huang, 1995). 
 
In our research, we generate a dummy variable for the father-in-law’s political identity 
during the period of land reform. The value of the dummy for “rich-middle peasant,” “rich 
peasant,” “landlord,” or “business owner” is 1; for other labels, it is 0. In politics, 
“rich-middle peasant” was combined with “lower-middle peasant” and “poor peasant or 
landless,” but “rich-middle peasant” category were treated almost as “black class.” in practice. 
Sato and Li (2007) reviewed the role of political identities in intergenerational educational 
attainment. Although their study distinguished “rich-middle peasants” from “rich peasants”   11   
and “landlords,” and used two dummies to control them separately, they found that the 
interaction terms of these political identities during the Maoist era are significantly negative. 
In other words, during Mao’s time both dummy variables had a negative effect, so we are 
justified in classifying “rich-middle peasants” in the same group as “landlords” and “rich 
peasants” when we generate our dummy variable. Although people who had undesirable 
political identities were repressed by the reversal of status, these families were restored to 
their prior status after Deng Xiaoping started the “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” 
economic reforms in 1978 (Sato and Li, 2007; 2008). In the cities, most families that had 
suffered loss regained their previous high social status, so we can hypothesize that if the 
father-in-law had undesirable political identity in the past, the two families joined by marriage 
might have resumed higher social status by the time CHIPS began in 1988. This would endow 
them with richer social networks and the father-in-law’s former political identity (basically, an 
inverse of his present socioeconomic status) would reflect the full extent of personal social 
networks. 
 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the instrumental variable, we take “how many 
people could help you during job hunting” as a dependent variable on the basis of equation (3), 
and take other explanatory variables and the father-in-law’s political identity as control 
variables. After the estimation of equation (8), we found that undesirable political identity can 
significantly increase the number of people who could help someone find a job. Its t-value is 
2.44 and its p-value is 0.015. If we perform an F-test on this single variable, its test value is 
5.98 which confirms it as a reasonably good instrumental variable. We surmise that the 
father-in-law’s political identity in the past will not influence someone’s industry entry in the 
labor market. Although this assumption cannot be tested directly, we can acquire indirect 
information in support of it. First, we put the father-in-law’s political identity in the industry 
entry model; the results show this variable to be insignificant. Then, according to each 
individual’s father-in-law’s political identity, we calculate the percentage of different groups 
in industries that have different wage levels; again the result shows that there is no significant 
difference. In low-wage industries, the percentage of individuals whose father-in-law had 
undesirable political identity is lower, but the high- and medium-wage industries had roughly 
equal percentages of individuals whose father-in-law had such identity. If we merge the low- 
and medium-wage industries, the combined group’s percentage of individuals whose 
father-in-law had undesirable political identity is a little higher than the percentage in   12   
high-wage industries, but the difference is not significant. (See Appendix Table 2.) 
 
We also use the father-in-law’s political identity as an instrumental variable in a two-stage 
least squares estimation of model (6), with the result shown in equation (7). If we focus on the 
coefficient of social networks in the two estimations, we find that its value is 0.103 in the IV 
estimation, but only 0.00656 in the OLS estimation. This result implies that people in 
low-wage industries depend more on social networks to find a job, and consequently the 
coefficient of social networks in the OLS regression was greatly underestimated. Of course, 
there might be some unobserved factors, such as work ability, which would generate 
estimation biases in the OLS regression. If it is harder for people with less ability or skill to 
enter high-wage industries, and if these people depend more on social networks to find a job, 
then the coefficient of social networks in the OLS regression might have been underestimated. 
 
 
5. Model Extension: Regional Comparison of the Impact of Social Network 
 
After identifying the influence of non-market factors on entry barriers in the labor market, we 
can ask whether the influence varies across regions that have different levels of marketization 
and economic development. In order to make regional comparisons, we divide our sample 
into two parts: the coastal part includes Beijing, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Guangdong; and the 
inland part contains Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Yunnan, Gansu, Sichuan, and Chongqing. 
As shown via models (9) and (10), the coefficient of social networks is slightly larger in the 
coastal region than in the inland region, but the difference is insignificant. Considering the 
possible endogeneity of social networks, we again use the IV method. Remember that the 
previous instrumental variable forces us to drop unmarried samples; however, the results of 
the OLS regressions are basically unchanged, except that relative party standing is 
insignificant. Similarly, for both the coastal and inland regions, the coefficient of social 
networks is much higher in IV-OLS than that in OLS. This implies an underestimation of the 
effect of social networks in the OLS regression. Comparing the OLS and IV-OLS regression 
results, we find that the coefficient of the instrumental variable increases from 0.00831 to 
0.173 in the coastal region and from 0.00517 to 0.0345 in the inland region. This means the 
estimation bias caused by social networks’ endogeneity is larger in the coastal region. After 
considering the endogenous factors, we conclude that social networks’ influence on entry into   13   
high-wage industries in the coastal region is about five times larger than its influence in the 
inland region. Actually, even if we do not use instrumental variable estimation, the coefficient 
of social network in the coastal region is higher. In other words, we do not find evidence 
supporting the claim that marketization and economic development have a reducing effect on 
social networks’ influence. 
 
Comparisons of other coefficients across regions are also very interesting. In the coastal 
region, education and experience each greatly increase the possibility of entering high-wage 
industries but these two productivity variables have much smaller (though still significant) 
values in the inland region. This is consistent with the fact that the market is more developed 
in the coastal region. It is worth noting that the coefficient of urban hukou in the coastal 
region is three times that in the inland region. This means hukou identity’s influence on 
industry entry is stronger in the coastal region, which is an unwelcome phenomenon in the 
process of marketization. It is also interesting that father’s education is not significant in the 
coastal region, but father’s party membership is significantly positive there. The situation is 
just the opposite in the inland region, where father’s education is significantly positive but his 
political status (party membership) is not significant. (See Table 3.) 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
Recognizing that industry monopoly profits and entry barriers in the labor market are two 
necessary conditions for inter-industrial wage inequality, we explored the determinants of 
labor market entry barriers empirically. Even when factors that might influence productivity 
(e.g., education, age, gender) are controlled for, we found that social networks, father’s 
education and political status (i.e., Communist Party membership), and an individual’s urban 
hukou identity are helpful factors for gaining entrance to high-wage industries. After 
addressing the endogeneity of social networks by using the father-in-law’s political identity 
(determined during the Mao era land reform) as an instrumental variable, we found that the 
importance of social networks for entering high-wage industries became greater. These 
findings show that inter-industry wage differentials are at least partly a result of labor market 
entry barriers due to non-market factors. When we estimated models for the coastal and inland 
regions separately and controlled for endogeneity by using the IV estimation, we found that   14   
social networks as well as education and experience are more important in the coastal region 
than the inland region. We also noticed that the effects of urban hukou identity on industry 
entry mainly occur in the coastal region. This regional variation shows that non-market 
factors are distorting the labor market mechanism in the coastal region, probably due to the 
fast pace of marketization there.   
 
The main policy implication of this paper is: in order to establish fair competition, China 
should break industry entry barriers in the urban labor market and thereby improve 
inter-industry wage equalization. Based on our analysis of the CHIPS data of 2002, we 
conclude that the realization of inter-industry wage equalization would reduce urban income 
inequality by 5–10%. If non-market entry barriers in the labor market of several monopoly 
industries can be removed, the type of industry would no longer be an important factor 
inducing wage differentials (Chen, Wan, and Lu, 2008). After all, it is salutary to implement 
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Table 1: Social networks and industry entries in the labor market   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 



















Social networks    0.00625 0.00609




  (0.00264)  (0.00264)    (0.00618) 
Uses social networks 
during job hunting 
      0.0381  
 
** 
      (0.0155) 







(0.0555)  (0.0555)  (0.0555)  (0.129) 







(0.00193)  (0.00193)  (0.00197)  (0.00198)  (0.00461) 







(0.00109)  (0.00109)  (0.00110)  (0.00110)  (0.00257) 







(0.00117)  (0.00117)  (0.00117)  (0.00117)  (0.00274) 







(0.0714)  (0.0715)  (0.0715)  (0.182) 
Relative party standing 
squared 
0.179  0.181  0.197 0.194
*  0.483 
* 
(0.117)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.309) 







(0.00674)  (0.00674)  (0.00674)  (0.0158) 
Single  0.0516  0.0504  0.0600  0.0650  0.133 
(0.0451)  (0.0451)  (0.0452)  (0.0452)  (0.106) 
Married  0.0465  0.0454  0.0435  0.0456  0.0957 
(0.0400)  (0.0400)  (0.0400)  (0.0400)  (0.0935) 







(0.0110)  (0.0110)  (0.0110)  (0.0259) 
Belongs to a minority 
group 
0.0359  0.0350  0.0345  0.0350  0.0793 
(0.0295)  (0.0295)  (0.0295)  (0.0295)  (0.0694) 
Father’s education 
(years) 





  (0.00143)  (0.00143)  (0.00334) 
Father’s party 
membership (Yes=1) 





  (0.0120)  (0.0120)  (0.0280) 
Father operated a 
business (Yes=1) 
    −0.00496  −0.00598  −0.0110 
    (0.0199)  (0.0199)  (0.0465) 









(0.0182)  (0.0182)  (0.0183)  (0.0422) 
Dependency ratio  0.0308  0.0327  0.0381  0.0351  0.0876 
(0.0275)  (0.0276)  (0.0276)  (0.0276)  (0.0645) 
Constant  −0.438 −0.441
***  −0.457
***  −0.475
***   
*** 
(0.106)  (0.106)  (0.108)  (0.108)   
No. of Obs.  9957  9957  9955  9951  9955 
Adusted R
2   




*** mean the coefficients are significant at <.10, <.05, and <.01, respectively. 
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Table 2: Social networks and industry entries in the labor market (IV estimation) 
 
  (3)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  OLS whole 
samples 
 
OLS  IV-OLS  First stage 
Social networks  0.00609 0.00650
**  0.103 
**   
(0.00263)  (0.00280)  (0.114)   
Father-in-law’s 
political identity 
      0.157
 
** 
    (0.0648) 




***  0.148 
*** 
(0.0555)  (0.0571)  (0.0632)  (0.221) 
Years of 
education   
.00574 0.00458









***  −0.00184 
*** 
(0.00110)  (0.00113)  (0.00122)  (0.00435) 
Age  −0.00628 −0.00632
***  −0.00574
***  −0.00638 
*** 




**  −0.168  0.751
(0.0715) 
* 




*  0.130  −0.625 
(0.117)  (0.180)  (0.207)  (0.696) 
Healthy  0.00117 0.0186




(0.00704)  (0.0108)  (0.0272) 
Single  0.0600       
(0.0452)       
Married  0.0435  0.0627  0.0486  0.159 
(0.0400)  (0.0730)  (0.0797)  (0.282) 
Male  0.141 0.141
***  0.138
***  0.0371 
*** 
(0.0110)  (0.0116)  (0.0131)  (0.0449) 
Belongs to a 
minority group 
0.0345  0.0398  0.0196  0.206
(0.0295) 
* 




*  0.000973 
*  0.0162
   (0.00143) 
*** 





* 0.0259      0.0241
**  0.0169 
* 
(0.0120)  (0.0124)  (0.0134)  (0.0481) 
Father operated a 
business (Yes=1) 
−0.00496  −0.0105  −0.00469  −0.0536 





***  0.264 *** 
   (0.0182) 
*** 
(0.0197)  (0.0365)  (0.0760) 
Dependency 
ratio 





(0.0304)  (0.0448)  (0.117) 
Constant  −0.457
*** −0.562      −0.592
***  0.315  *** 
(0.108)  (0.128)  (0.141)  (0.493) 
No. of Obs.  9955  8617  8617  8617 
Adjusted R 0.053 




*** mean the coefficients are significant at <.10, <.05, and <.01, respectively.   18   
Table 3: Regional Comparison of social networks and industry entry in the labor market   
 
  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 









Social networks  0.00677  0.00543 0.00831
*  0.00517 
*  0.173  0.0345 
(0.00458)  (0.00318)  (0.00505)  (0.00332)  (0.151)  (0.171) 
Has local urban 
hukou 
0.460 0.0832 






(0.0708)  (0.0924)  (0.0733)  (0.112)  (0.0755) 
Years of education    0.0106 0.00336 
***  0.0102 0.00203 
**  0.00158  0.000882 











(0.00120)  (0.00254)  (0.00122)  (0.00307)  (0.00142) 








  (0.00260) 
**




*  −0.316  0.0225  −0.395 −0.00499 
* 
(0.191)  (0.0766)  (0.197)  (0.112)  (0.240)  (0.196) 
Relative party 
standing squared 
0.466  0.151  0.416  −0.108  0.416  −0.0765 
(0.347)  (0.118)  (0.357)  (0.203)  (0.413)  (0.275) 
Healthy  0.00448  0.0218 0.0128 
***  0.0220 0.00541 
***  0.0195 
(0.0121)  (0.00796)  (0.0129)  (0.00826)  (0.0164)  (0.0163) 
Single  0.0237  0.0607         
(0.0864)  (0.0520)         
Married  −0.0133  0.0731  0.0393  0.0767  0.0103  0.0723 
(0.0782)  (0.0452)  (0.156)  (0.0800)  (0.182)  (0.0846) 








(0.0131)  (0.0211)  (0.0137)  (0.0257)  (0.0147) 
Belongs to a 
minority group 
0.0716  0.0106  0.0827  0.0172  0.00357  0.0150 
(0.0554)  (0.0341)  (0.0619)  (0.0366)  (0.102)  (0.0391) 
Father’s education 
(years) 
−0.00145  0.00468 −0.00232 
***  0.00490 −0.00386 
***  0.00429 





*  0.0406 0.0162 
*  0.0509 0.0144 
* 
(0.0219)  (0.0140)  (0.0233)  (0.0144)  (0.0286)  (0.0179) 
Father operated a 
business (Yes=1) 
0.0179  −0.0176  −0.00608  −0.0119  −0.0195  −0.00761 
(0.0352)  (0.0238)  (0.0393)  (0.0250)  (0.0472)  (0.0356) 










(0.0220)  (0.0354)  (0.0233)  (0.0762)  (0.0364) 
Dependency ratio  0.0529  0.0304  0.0799  0.0533  0.141 0.0598 
* 
(0.0483)  (0.0332)  (0.0554)  (0.0358)  (0.0852)  (0.0524) 
Constant  −0.599 −0.151 
***  −0.663 −0.202 
***  −0.652 −0.345 
** 
(0.177)  (0.128)  (0.230)  (0.145)  (0.266)  (0.250) 
No. of Obs.  3798  6157  3160  5457  3160  5457 
Adjusted R 0.063 




*** mean the coefficients are significant at < .10, < .05, and < .01, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 1: Statistical Descriptions of Variables 
 
Variable  No. of Obs.  Mean    S. D.    Minimum    Maximum 
   
Industrial_ranking  9957  0.080    0.529    -1  1 
Ever changed jobs  9957  0.093    0.291    0  1 
Has local urban hukou  9957  0.991    0.095    0  1 
Gender (male=1)  9957  1.443    0.497    1  2 
Marriage (married=1)  9957  1.916    0.334    1  3 
Age  9957  40.550    9.256    1  77 
Healthy  9957  3.891    0.822    1  5 
Relative party standing  9957  0.096    0.181    0  2.115 
Belongs to a minority 
group 
9957  1.040    0.197    1  2 
Years of education    9957  11.429    2.986    0  23 
Years of experience  9957  20.212    9.680    0  43 
Social networks  9957  1.238    2.035    0  24 
Uses social networks 
during job hunting 
9957  0.144    0.390    0  9 
Father’s education 
(years) 
9957  5.549    3.973    0  17 
Father’s party 
membership (Yes=1) 
9955  1.675    0.468    1  2 
Father’s party 
membership (Yes=1) 
9955  1.923    0.266    1  2 









Appendix Table 2: Group Comparison of Social Networks and Father-in-Law’s Political Identity 
 
Industry type  Number of people who could 
help find a job 


























Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. 